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but he rarely would be able to show that 
the family members have exaggerated the 
degree of sleeplessness, depression, or emo-
tional trauma suffered." Id. 
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, relied on 
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676 (1986) and 
concluded that "the amount of harm one 
causes does bear upon the extent of his per-
sonal responsibility." Booth, 107 S.Ct. at 
2542 (emphasis added). In Tison, two 
brothers who planned and assisted in their 
father's escape from prison were sentenced 
to death because in the course of their 
escape, their father murdered four inno-
cent poeple. Scalia's dissent pointed out 
that the difference between life and death 
for the two defendants was a matter 
"wholly unrelated to the[ir] blamewor-
thiness," yet they were held personally 
responsible for the degree of harm that 
they had caused. 
The impact of this decision is so poten-
tially far-reaching as to render the recent 
"victims rights" legislation virtually 
obsolete. Although Justice Powell speci-
fically distinguishes between the use of the 
VIS in capital sentencing hearings as 
opposed to noncapital cases, the distinc-
tion can hardly withstand the weakest 
attack on its logic. It remains to be seen 
just how far the Court will go in inter-
preting the effects of this decision, but the 
obvious implications suggest the begin-
nings of a new trend in "victims' rights." 
- Natasha Sethi 
u.s. v. Salerno: FEDERAL BAIL 
REFORM ACT DOES NOT 
CONTRAVENE U_S. 
CONSTITUTION 
In United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 
2095 (1987) the Supreme Court, as a mat-
ter of first impression, held that the 1984 
Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.c. § 3141 et seq., 
(" Act") does not, on its face, violate either 
the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment or the excessive bail clause of the 
eighth amendment. 
The Act authorizes the pretrial deten-
tion of arrestees who are charged with cer-
tain serious felonies and who are found, 
after an adversary hearing, to pose a threat 
to the safety of individuals or to the com-
munity. 
Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafero 
were arrested on March 21, 1986, on a 29 
count indictment alleging various Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire 
fraud offenses, extortion and various 
criminal gambling violations. 
At arraignment, the government moved 
to have the arrestees detained pursuant to 
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§ 3142. Section 3142 provides that an 
arrestee may be held without bail if no 
condition or combination of conditions 
would assure appearance at trial or assure 
the safety of another person or the com-
munity. The government claimed that no 
condition of release would assure the safe-
ty of any person or persons in the com-
munity. § 3142(e). The government 
proffered evidence which showed that 
Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese 
Crime family and that Cafero was a "cap-
tain" in the family. Evidence also showed 
that the two men had participated in wide 
ranging conspiracies and that Salerno per-
sonally participated in two murder con-
spiracies. 
The District Court granted the govern-
ment's motion finding that the govern-
ment met its burden of establishing by 
clear and convincing evidence that no con-
dition or combination of conditions of 
release would insure the safety of the com-
munity or any person. United States v. 
Salerno, 631 F.Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
Both Salerno and Cafero appealed. They 
contended that, to the extent the Act per-
mits pretrial detention on the ground that 
the arrestee is likely to commit future 
crimes, the Act is unconstitutional on its 
face. 
The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit agreed. It concluded 
that a person could not be detained consis-
tent with due process merely because that 
person was thought to present a danger to 
the community. United States v. Salerno, 
794 F.2d 64 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Second 
Circuit reasoned that the system of 
government in the United States holds per-
sons accountable for past actions, and not 
anticipated future actions. The govern-
ment appealed. 
The Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist 
speaking for the majority, began by stating 
that because respondents had challenged 
the Act on its face, they bore the burden 
of showing that the Act could not pass 
constitutional muster under any set of cir-
cumstances. 
The fact that the Bail Reform Act 
might operate unconstitutionally 
under some conceivable set of cir-
cumstances is insufficient to render it 
wholly invalid... Schall v. Martin, 
[467 U.S. 253 (1984)]. 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct at 2100. 
The Court first addressed respondent's 
challenge (if the Act as violative of both 
substantive and procedural due process. 
"Substantive due process" prevents the 
government from engaging in conduct that 
"shocks the conscience," Roehm v. Cali· 
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), or inter-
feres with rights "implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937). United States 
v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101. 
Respondent's main contention under 
"substantive" due process was that the Act 
authorized impermissible punishment 
before any adjudication of guilt. The 
Court rejected this premise, stating that 
"[t]he mere fact that a person is detained 
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion 
that the government has imposed punish-
ment." Id. at 2121, quoting Bell v. WolfISh, 
441 U.S. 520, 532 (1979). 
In determining whether the detention is 
punitive or regulatory, the Court fashion-
ed the test " 'whether an alternative pur-
pose to which [the restriction] may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, 
and whether it ,appears excessive in rela-
tion to the alternativt purpose assigned [to 
it].' " Ibid., quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza· 
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963); 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101. 
Applying this test, the Court concluded 
that the detention imposed falls on the 
regulatory side of the dichotomy, thus no 
infringement of due process exists. 
The legislative history of the Bail Re-
form Act clearly indicates that Con-
gress did not formulate the pretrial 
detention provisions as punishment 
for dangerous individuals. See S. Rep. 
No. 98-225, p. 8. Congress instead per-
ceived pretrial detention as a potential 
solution to a pressing societal problem. 
Id. at 4-7. 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101. 
The Court re-enforced the conclusion 
that the Act was regulatory by focusing on 
the limited circumstances with which a 
person may be detained. Section 3142(F) 
allows for detention only in cases involv-
ing crimes of violence, offenses which the 
crime is life imprisonment or death, 
serious drug offenses, or repeat offenders. 
Furthermore, the Speedy Trial Act, 18 
U.S.c. §3161, remains in effect. United 
States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2101. 
Also persuasive to the Court was the 
long line of decisions which upheld the 
government's authority to invade an indi-
vidual's interest in liberty. In each of those 
cases, the Court found the government's 
interest in detention compelling. In the 
instant case "[t]he government's interest in 
preventing crime by arrestees is both legiti-
mate and compelling." By enacting the 
Bail Reform Act, Congress made specific 
findings that individuals on bail awaiting 
trial "are far more likely to be responsible 
for dangerous acts in the community after 
arrest." S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 6-7. 
The Court found that the already com-
pelling interest in preventing crime is 
heightened when the government has con-
vincing proof that the arrestee presents a 
demonstrable danger to the community. 
"Under these narrow circumstances, socie-
ty's interest in crime prevention is at its 
greatest." United States v. Salerno, 107 
S.Ct. 2095 at 2103. 
When the government proves by clear 
and convincing evidence that an 
arrestee presents an identified and arti-
culable threat to an individual or the 
community, we believe that, consis-
tent with the Due Process Clause, a 
court may disable the arrestee from 
executing that threat. Under these cir-
cumstances, we cannot categorically 
state that pretrial detention "offends 
some principle of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934). 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2103. 
The Court thus concluded there was no 
facial violation of substantive due process. 
Turning to the facial challenge against 
the procedures, the Court stated that "[t]o 
sustain [the procedures] against such a 
challenge, we need only find them "ade-
quate to authorize the pretrial detention of 
at least some persons charged with 
crimes." Id. at 2103, quoting Schall v. Afar· 
tin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). The Court then 
went on to detail the procedures called for 
under the Act. 
Detainees have the right to counsel, to 
testify, present information by proffer or 
otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses. 
The government has the burden and must 
prove its case by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Section 3142(F); and the judge must 
include written findings. §3142(i). There is 
also immediate appellate review. §3245(c). 
The Court concluded that the extensive 
safeguards were sufficient to repel a facial 
challenge against the procedures. 
The Court turned finally to respon-
dent's challenge based on the excessive bail 
clause of the eighth amendment. The 
Court stated that the U[p ]rimary function 
of bail is to safeguard the Courts' role in 
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of 
defendants .... " United States v. Salerno, 
107 S.Ct. at 2104. However, the Court 
refused to interpret the bail clause in such 
a fashion as to make bail available in all cir-
cumstances. 
The Court stated that, "[Tlhe Eighth 
Amendment does not prevent Congress 
from defining the classes of cases in which 
bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus, 
in criminal cases bail is not compulsory 
where the punishment may be death. 
Indeed, the very language of the Amend-
ment fails to say all arrests must be 
bailable." United States v. Salerno, 107 
S.Ct. at 2105, quoting Carlson v. Landon, 
342 U.S. 524, 545-546 (1952). 
Thus, the Court expressly empowered 
Congress to impose other considerations 
other than questions of flight when deci-
ding whether to allow an arrestee out on 
bail. 
We believe that when Congress has 
mandated detention on the basis of a 
compelling interest other than preven-
tion of flight, as it has here, the Eighth 
Amendment does not require release 
on bail. 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. at 2105. 
In sum, the Supreme Court has found 
that Congress may constitutionally 
impose considerations other than flight to 
the decision of whether an arrestee is bail 
eligible. Where the considerations are 
compelling, the Court will defer to the 
will of Congress. 
-Michael Scott Friedman 
Arizona v. Mauro: POllCE ACTIONS 
OF WI1NESSING AND 
RECORDING A PRE-DETENTION 
MEETING DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
AN INTERROGATION IN VIOLA-
TION OF MIRANDA 
In Arizona v. Mauro, - U.S. -, 107 
S.Ct. 1931 (1987), the United States 
Supreme Court held that an "interroga-
tion" did not result from police actions of 
recording and witnessing a predetention 
meeting between the accused and his 
spouse. In reversing a judgment of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court, the Court decided 
that Mauro's invocation of his Miranda 
rights did not extend any privilege of con-
fidentiality to remarks made to his wife in 
a "private" meeting arranged by police at 
the insistence of the defendant's spouse. 
After admitting to police that he had 
murdered his son, William Carl Mauro 
was arrested and advised of his constitu-
tional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Mauro was twice read 
his right to refuse to make any statement 
without an attorney present. At Mauro's 
request, police interrogation immediately 
halted. 
Meanwhile in another room at the police 
station, Mrs. Mauro was also being ques-
tioned concerning the murder of her child. 
After questioning, she became adamant in 
her demand to meet with her husband. 
Although reluctant at first, the police con-
sented to the meeting only on the condi-
tion that an officer be present. The Mauros 
were not consulted prior to their meeting, 
and their brief conversation was recorded 
by a tape recorder within their plain view. 
During the meeting, Mrs. Mauro expressed 
despair, while Mr. Mauro advised her not 
to answer any questions until an attorney 
was present. Mauro, 107 S.Ct. at 1933. 
At trial, the defense put forth an insanity 
plea which the prosecution rebutted by 
playing back the recorded conversation, 
and arguing that the recording showed 
Mauro was sane on the day of the murder. 
The trial court refused Mauro's motion to 
suppress the recording, rejecting the 
defense that it was a product of police 
interrogation in violation of his Miranda 
rights. Mauro was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death, and the present 
appeal ensued. 
In reversing the trial court decision, the 
Arizona Supreme Court found that the 
police had interrogated Mauro under 
Miranda by allowing him to speak to his 
wife in the presence of an officer. Arizona 
'0. Mauro, 149 Ariz. 24, 716 P.2d 393 
(1986). According to the court, the inter-
rogation was invalid because Mauro had 
requested counsel before any further ques-
tioning. The court based its holding on 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), 
which held that interrogation may include 
practices "that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect." Id. at 30t. 
Since two police officers had testified dur-
ing pretrial hearings that they thought it 
possible that Mauro might make 
incriminating remarks during the meeting 
with his spouse, the court found that Innis 
applied, and overturned the trial court's 
admission of the recorded conversation 
into evidence. 
The Supreme Court reversed, by a 5 to 
4 margin. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Powell focused on the issue of whether the 
police actions were the "functional equiva-
lent" of interrogation under Innis. In hold-
ing that no interrogation occurred, the 
Court found that the officer present at the 
meeting between the Mauros posed no 
questions to the defendant. This had the 
effect of rejecting the minority view, 
embraced by Justice Stevens, that the 
police "employed a powerful psychologi-
cal ploy" against Mauro. Mauro, 107 S.Ct. 
at 1937. Justice Stevens, for the dissent, 
argued that the police actions over-
whelmed Mauro because they did not pro-
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